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SOME students in my legal philosophy classes suggest it is regretful that a 
person who is in love with another person of the same gender may not marry 
the latter. Homosexuals, my passionate students argue, should have equal 
rights, including the fundamental right to enter into a legally recognised 
exclusive lifelong relationship. 
To these students, the argument that the law does not deny the homosexual a 
right to marry, he just has to marry someone of a different gender, will 
understandably seem facetious. 
But does the legal inability of homosexuals to enter into a matrimonial 
relationship with their Significant Other suggest the law discriminates against 
them, contrary to Article 12 of the Constitution which guarantees that every 
person is equal before the law and entitled to equal treatment of the law? 
Advocates of change in matrimonial laws may argue along several lines. 
First, the argument of neutrality - that the state ought not impose its moral 
judgment and limit marriage to persons of different gender; second, the 
positive moral argument that the current definition of marriage is erroneous 
and discriminatory. 
In relation to this argument, it may be noted that the very view that the state 
may not by law impose its moral judgment on individuals often involves a 
positive moral judgment which is not neutral. 
It may involve, for example, the assertion that the individual's will is sovereign 
in matters of sexual intimacy fundamental to a person's identity and 
happiness. But this argument - for the sovereignty of the individual's will - is in 
effect a moral argument for state support for the exercise of such will. The 
state must render to such individuals the attendant benefits of marriage - tax 
incentives, adoption rights, intestacy rights, and so on. So what had seemed 
to be the state's refusal to make a moral judgment that limits marriage to its 
traditional definition, so that it could remain neutral, puts upon the state the 
same duties as it would have had if it made a positive moral judgment that 
extended the definition of marriage. 
More sophisticated advocates of change make the positive moral judgment for 
the extended definition of marriage. The traditional definition is conventional 
and ought to be remade, they say. 
First, what is the traditional definition that advocates of change seek to 
remake? Princeton professor of jurisprudence Robert George, in his work The 
Clash Of Orthodoxies, has defined it as a two-in-one-flesh communion of 
persons that is consummated and actualised by acts that are reproductive in 
type, whether or not they are reproductive in effect (or even motivated by the 
desire to reproduce). As such, persons who are infertile or have no intent for 
procreation may still participate in marital acts. 
Is this definition metaphysical or religious? Or is it conventional and malleable 
according to opinion? The answer hinges on whether there is indeed 
something unique about the two-in-one-flesh communion that Professor 
George mentioned. 
American professor of ethics Germain Grisez has been quoted by Prof 
George to explain it thus: 'Though a male and a female are complete 
individuals with respect to other functions...with respect to reproduction they 
are only potential parts of a mated pair, which is the complete organism 
capable of reproducing sexually. Even if the mated pair is sterile, intercourse, 
provided it is the reproductive behaviour characteristic of the species, makes 
the copulating male and female one organism.' 
The idea of the male and the female as a single reproductive principle 
undergirds the idea of a two-in-one-flesh communion. Prof George suggests 
that a sexual act that is reproductive in type is unique in that it unites two 
persons organically; it is physically impossible for persons of the same gender 
to be regarded as a single reproductive principle. 
Some may disagree that the ability to combine in a single reproductive 
principle has any normative significance. As Catholic theologian Rosemary 
Ruether notes, and Emory University professor Michael Perry cites in his 
latest book, Toward A Theory Of Human Rights, advocates of change may 
argue, for example, that love may be centred on 'communion between two 
selves rather than on biologistic concepts of procreative complementarity'. 
Considering these opposing views, I asked my students whether they could 
come up with a workable redefinition of marriage that did not discriminate. 
Some suggested marriage should be the lifelong exclusive commitment of two 
persons engaged in a sexual relationship. 
But what if you have two men committed to a lifelong friendship, but who have 
no homosexual tendencies and who indeed have decided to be celibate? If 
homosexuals could marry, should not celibate people of the same gender 
have equal rights to 'marry'? Was not the association of marriage with sex as 
conventional as the association of marriage with sex of the reproductive type? 
Or what about threesomes or foursomes engaged in exclusive sexual 
relationships among themselves, if they too sought the right to marry? 
If marriage laws are not to discriminate, should we not refrain from 
discriminating against people who have the capacity to love more than one 
Significant Other? 
How to find a workable redefinition of marriage that is inclusive yet not over-
inclusive, that does not discriminate yet draws the line somewhere? 
Some might suggest that marriage can indeed be extended to cover the 
situations mentioned. But if so, any two (or more) persons could jump on the 
bandwagon and claim lifelong commitments for tax and other benefits. 
Given all these problems, perhaps the best thing is that the traditional 
definition of marriage should remain. 
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